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The history of Greek-Serbian relations during the Balkan wars and the First World War has largely been already written.1 By contrast, there are not 
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many studies on Greek-Serbian/Yugoslav relations during the interwar peri-
od. This article is based on this author’s study2 on Greece and the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes from the Paris Peace Conference in 1919/20 to the 
denunciation of the Greek-Serbian Treaty of Alliance (1913) in late 1924. 
The prevalence of Eleftherios Venizelos in Greek politics after 1917 to 
the detriment of King Constantine and his supporters, that is to say the pro-
German wing of the Greek political scene, was the key factor for a new rap-
prochement between Athens and Belgrade. Frequent border incidents and com-
plaints of the local population living near the frontier on both sides did not 
lead to political tensions. Nikola Pašić along with El. Venizelos attached major 
importance to mutual understanding between the two states. Their main con-
cern was to set up a common diplomatic front against Bulgaria. In October 1918 
Venizelos met the Serbian minister in Athens, Živojin Balugdžić, and Nikola 
Pašić Greek chargé d’affaires in Belgrade, Ioannis Kountouriotis. At both meet-
ings there were assurances that Serbia would support Greek claims to Eastern 
and Western Thrace3. However, Kountouriotis considered it necessary that 
Greece should regain Serbian public sympathy. To that end, he did not hesitate 
to ask Pašić to intervene in the Serbian Press in order for it to adopt a more 
friendly rhetoric towards Greece.4 The same request came from Pašić as regards 
the Greek Press. It probably was not a coincidence that the Greek newspapers at 
the end of 1918 and beginning of 1919 featured the tragic losses of the Serbian 
nation, the devastated Serbian capital, the suffering economy and the need to 
revive the Balkan coalition.5
Members of such a coalition should be considered Greece, Serbia and 
Romania. The coalition would be formed on an anti-Bulgarian basis. The en-
largement of the coalition could be canvassed only after the singing of the Peace 
Treaty. On 21 November 1918, Greece, Serbia and Romania sent a joint memo-
randum to the Foreign Office, in which they were notifying their willingness to 
work together at the upcoming Conference according to the principle of nation-
2 Athanasios Loupas, Από τις σχέσεις συμμαχίας στην ψύχρανση: Η Ελλάδα και το Βασίλειο των 
Σέρβων, Κροατών και Σλοβένων, 1919–1924 [From alliance to cooling: Greece and the King-
dom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes] (Athens: Herodotos, in press). 
3 Hassiotis, Ελληνοσερβικές σχέσεις 1913–1918, 231–232. 
4 Υπηρεσία Διπλωματικού και Ιστορικού Αρχείου (Service of Diplomatic and Historical Archives, 
hereafter SDHA), Αρχείο Κεντρικής Υπηρεσίας (Central Service Archives, CSA) 1919 Α-5–V 
(10) Περί των Βαλκανικών Κρατών – Σερβία [About Balkan States – Serbia], Kountouriotis to 
Diomidis, 28 December 1918, No. 647.
5 Μακεδονία (Makedonia), 31/12/1918; Εμπρός (Embros), 1/1/1919; Ακρόπολις (Akropolis), 
4/1/1919. 
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alities.6 So, by the time the Peace Conference began, Athens and Belgrade had 
laid the foundations of a fruitful cooperation. The Greek kingdom was the only 
neighbouring country with which the newly-established Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes (hereafter KSCS) did not have any border disputes.7 In his 
memorandum regarding Greek national claims, dated 30 December 1918 and 
distributed to the Entente delegations at Paris in January 1919, Venizelos did 
not mention at all the Greeks in Northern Macedonia, now part of the KSCS, 
while Yugoslav delegates counted on Greece’s support to their national claims. 
In addition to Bulgarian aspirations in Macedonia and Thrace, Italian claims on 
the Adriatic (Dalmatia, Istria, Montenegro), Albania and Asia Minor consti-
tuted a great threat to both Greek and Yugoslav interests. 
From the Peace Conference in Paris to the Greek elections  
( January 1919 – November 1920) 
The recognition of the new kingdom was of great importance to the Yugoslav 
delegation. Italian aspirations, however, appeared to be a considerable obstacle. 
The Greek delegation found itself in an awkward position in this matter. Ac-
cording to Venizelos, Greece should come to an understanding with Italy in or-
der to settle their disputes over Northern Epirus and Asia Minor.8 On the other 
hand, however, the Greek Prime Minister was insisting on Greece becoming the 
first state to officially recognize the KSCS, as a gesture of symbolic significance 
which would positively impact Serbian public opinion. In his effort to remain 
neutral in the Italo-Yugoslav antagonism over the Adriatic, Venizelos instructed 
the Deputy Foreign Minister, Alexadros Diomidis, to handle the matter of rec-
ognition in such a manner as not to impair Italian interests.9 However, Diomidis 
failed to do so. Having in mind earlier instructions, according to which Greece 
was to refrain from any action which might dissatisfy Italy, Diomidis had held 
off carrying out Venizelos’ orders. New and clearer instructions from Paris were 
6 N. Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece at the Paris Peace Conference 1919 (Thessaloniki: Institute for 
Balkan Studies, 1978), 74.
7 A. Mitrović, “The 1919–1920 Peace Conference in Paris and the Yugoslav State: An Histori-
cal Evaluation”, in Creation of Yugoslavia, ed. Djordjević, 209; I. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris 
Peace Conference. A Study in Frontier-making (Yale University Press, 1963), 96.
8 E. Venizelos, Τα Κείμενα, τ. Β’ 1915–1920 [The Records, vol. II: 1915–1920] (Athens: Lib-
erals’ Club, 1982), 641, 648. See also R. L Woodall, The Albanian Problem during the Peace-
making 1919–1920 (Memphis State University, 1978), 104.
9 SDHA, Αρχείο Πρεσβείας Παρισίων [Paris Embassy Archives, hereafter PEA] 1920/3.6 
Ελληνοσερβικές Σχέσεις [Greek-Serbian Relations], Politis to Diomidis, Paris 19 December 
1918/2  January 1919, No. 444
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needed in order to overcome Diomidis’ reservations. After all, a Greek-Italian 
understanding seemed out of reach in early 1919. But Greece had already lost 
precious time. At any rate, what mattered most was that Greece missed the op-
portunity to be the first country to recognize the KSCS, as Venizelos fervently 
desired.10 It is true, though, that it was believed in certain political and mili-
tary circles in Athens that the new Yugoslav kingdom, due to its military power, 
might be a potential threat to Greece’s national security in the long run.11 On 
the whole, however, the establishment of the KSCS was cordially welcomed in 
Greece insofar as it was seen as an implementation of the principle of nationali-
ties. The enlargement of Romania and the creation of the KSCS were viewed by 
Greek policy-makers as a shift in the balance of power in the Balkans. Thus, the 
territorial expansion of Greece was more than necessary to maintain the Balkan 
equilibrium.12  
Since then, Greek and Yugoslav officials endeavoured to counter the Bul-
garian initiatives at the Peace Conference and promote their common interests. 
Pointing out that Bulgaria’s disarmament had been encountering a lot of difficul-
ties the Yugoslav delegation proposed to Entente Headquarters in Constantino-
ple the siege of Strumnitsa by Entente forces, including Greek units. The heads 
of the Greek and Yugoslav delegations also sent a joint diplomatic note to the 
French Prime Minister, Georges Clemenceau, alerting him to the threat stem-
ming from the activities of Bulgarian komitadjis on the Yugoslav-Bulgarian and 
Greek-Bulgarian borders. Venizelos also suggested the deployment of Greek, 
Yugoslav and Romanian troops to the southern Bulgarian border in order to 
strengthen the meagre Entente forces and his country’s negotiating position,13 
but his suggestion was not adopted. The idea of launching military operations 
against Bulgaria was entertained once more in August 1919. In reply to Clem-
enceau’s query about the Greek army’s readiness, Venizelos stressed that it was 
capable of dealing with local insurrections in Thrace but that it was not in a 
position to wage a two-front war against Turkey and Bulgaria. He held, though, 
that should Sofia resist the implementation of the Peace Treaty, Greece along 
with the KSCS and Romania would be willing to force Bulgaria into accepting 
the agreement.14 
10 Ibid., Venizelos to Diomidis, Paris 2/15 February 1919, No. 1488.
11 SDHA, CSA, 1919 A-5–V (10), op. cit., Kountouriotis to Diomidis, 28 December 1918, 
No. 647
12 Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece at the Paris Peace Conference, 67–68, Hassiotis, Ελληνοσερβικές 
σχέσεις 1913–1918, 223; D. Dakin, Η ενοποίηση της Ελλάδας, 1770–1923 [The Unification of 
Greece], trans. A. Xanthopoulos (Athens: MIET, 2001), 334. 
13 Desanka Todorović, Jugoslavija i balkanske države, 1918–1923 (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 
1979), 36–37. 
14 Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece at the Paris Peace Conference, 267.
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The Greek-Serbian cooperation applied also to the field of propaganda 
during the Peace Conference in Paris. Both sides made several attempts to high-
light the dramatic effect that the Bulgarian occupation had on the Greek and 
Serbian population in Eastern Macedonia and South Serbia respectively, and 
at the same time sought to promote their own perspectives on demographics 
in Macedonia and Thrace. The studies Le Peninsule balkanique by Jovan Cvijić, 
Professor at the University of Belgrade, and Les Bulgares peints par eux-mêmes 
by Victor Kühne – the latter also being translated in English at the initiative of 
the Greek-British Association15 – were the most typical examples of the above-
mentioned policy. As products of Greek-Serbian cooperation may also be seen 
the pamphlets entitled Les mensonges bulgaires and Une reponse à “la vérité sur 
les accusations contre la Bulgarie”. Those two pamphlets were written in order 
to confute Bulgarian arguments (La vérité sur les accusations contre la Bulgarie) 
about the Bulgarian occupation in Eastern Macedonia.16 
The Greek-Serbian cooperation produced palpable results on 17 Sep-
tember 1919 when the Paris Conference ordered the Bulgarian troops out of 
Strumnitsa and Western Thrace. Two days later the terms of the peace treaty 
were delivered to the Bulgarian delegation. On 27 November 1919 the newly-
elected Bulgarian government of Aleksandar Stamboliyski signed the Treaty of 
Neuilly. The treaty provided for territorial cessions to neighbouring countries: 
to the KSCS: a) the western provinces of Tsaribrod and Bosilevgrad, which 
were of particular strategic importance; and b) the city of Strumnitsa; and to 
Romania: c) Southern Dobruja. At the same time, an inter-allied administration 
was imposed in Western Thrace, thereby depriving Bulgaria of a territorial out-
let to the Aegean Sea. Nonetheless, an economic outlet was ensured to Bulgaria 
by the signatories (article 48, paragraph 3). 
On 25 April 1920 the San Remo Conference transferred the administra-
tion of Western Thrace to the Greek authorities, concluding the integration of 
the territory into the Greek state. This triggered a common and prompt reac-
tion of Turkish nationalists and Bulgarian komitadjis who wished to oust Greek 
political and military authorities and to declare Thrace autonomous. The lead-
ing figure of that short-lived movement was Cafer Tayar, an Ottoman officer 
of Albanian origin. The Turkish-Bulgarian danger was evident in South Ser-
bia as well. The Serbian Press in Skoplje imputed the rise of the Communist 
Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) to the collusion of Bulgarian and Turkish elements 
and stressed that there were contacts between the Young Turks and the Muslim 
15 Hassiotis, Ελληνοσερβικές σχέσεις 1913–1918, 231; Miranda Paximadopoulou-Stavrinou, Η 
Δυτική Θράκη στην εξωτερική πολιτική της Βουλγαρίας. Το Ζήτημα της Βουλγαρικής Οικονομικής 
Διεξόδου στο Αιγαίο (1919–1923) [Western Thrace in the foreign policy of Bulgaria. The ques-
tion of Bulgaria’s economic outlet to the Aegean Sea] (Athens: Gutemberg, 1997), 28, fn. 15. 
16 Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece at the Paris Peace Conference, 86–87.
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population living in the southern provinces of the KSCS. At the same time, key 
figures of the Turkish community in Skoplje were arrested on the accusation of 
bearing subversive ideas against the Yugoslav state.17 Various rumours regarding 
the number of troops that Tayar had at his disposal for the upcoming Turkish-
Bulgarian uprising in Thrace in September or the readiness of Albanian irregu-
lars to take up arms against the KSCS18 proved to be false. Thus, Yugoslav as-
sistance was not necessary in defeating Tayar’s movement.19 
In view of the new circumstances, i.e. the territorial enlargement of the 
two states and the fact that one of them (Kingdom of Serbia) no longer existed 
as a legal entity, a redefinition of the 1913 Greek-Serbian Treaty of Alliance 
was needed.20 In the spring of 1920 Balugdžić tabled the issue claiming that “it 
would be ludicrous if Greece demanded military assistance from the Yugoslav 
Government for war in Asia Minor, just as it would be ridiculous if Yugoslavia 
had similar demands for military operations against Hungary or against some 
other far-flung state”.21 Greece sought to preserve the alliance in order to secure 
the status quo as it had been formulated by the treaties of Bucharest (1913) and 
Neuilly (1919). In other words, to safeguard the Greek-Bulgarian border and 
to maintain a common front with the KSCS against Bulgaria. In order to pre-
vent misunderstandings such as had arisen in 1915, it was agreed to clarify their 
mutual obligations. This was to be achieved either by concluding a new treaty 
or by signing an interpretative protocol. Both sides agreed on the latter solu-
tion. However, the negotiations had not been concluded and the issue remained 
unsettled.22 
Despite a convergence of political and strategic views between Athens 
and Belgrade, Greek-Yugoslav relations did not go without disagreements, the 
main of which concerned Italy. Being at loggerheads with Rome over Fiume 
17 SDHA, CSA  1920/22.1, Ελληνοσερβικές σχέσεις (θέματα πολιτικά, στρατιωτικά, εμπορικά) 
[Greek-Serbian relations (political, military and commercial affairs)], Picheon to Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Skoplje, 15 March 1920, No. 83; 25 February 1920, No. 60; and 10 March 
1920, No. 75.
18 Ibid., Picheon to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Skoplje, 26 August 1920, No. 296; Staff Ser-
vice to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 24 July 1920, No. 465/ii/2660. 
19 Todorović, Jugoslavija i balkanske države, 85–86. 
20 In accordance with article 7 of the treaty Serbia was granted freedom for her transit trade 
through the port of Thessaloniki. On 10/23 May 1914 a Convention Relative to Transit 
through Salonica was concluded between the Royal Hellenic Government and the Royal 
Serbian Government. In accordance with article 1 of the Convention a section of the port 
was assigned to Serbia for its transit trade. Due to the outbreak of the First World War the 
Convention was not ratified. 
21  SDHA, CSA 1920/21.3, Φάκελος Σερβίας [Serbia File], Memorandum, 28 May 1920.
22 Ibid. 
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(Rijeka), whose port was of vital importance to the Yugoslav economy, Belgrade 
perceived the Italian factor as a threat to Yugoslav interests.23 On the other hand, 
Venizelos pursued a more conciliatory policy towards Rome which bore fruit on 
29 July 1919 when a non-binding agreement with the Italian Minister of For-
eign Affairs, Tomasso Tittoni, was signed. The agreement provided for an over-
all settlement of the Greek-Italian disputes: the Dodecanese, with the exception 
of Rhodes, was to be ceded to Greece and Italy was also to support Greek claims 
in Northern Epirus. Greece, for her part, pledged to support an Italian mandate 
for central Albania and to secure a free zone to the port of Smyrna, already un-
der Greek administration. Venizelos had not intended to substitute the Greek-
Yugoslav alliance, which was a keystone of his policy, with the agreement of 29 
July 1919, but to square things with Rome. Nevertheless, the Venizelos-Tittoni 
agreement gave rise to considerable discontent in the KSCS. Greek officials 
made statements in the spirit of appeasement wishing to reassure their Yugo-
slavs counterparts that the agreement was not a turn against the KSCS, but 
quite the contrary, the latter would benefit from it since Italy should no longer 
back up Bulgarian claims.24 In practice, however, the agreement never entered 
into force and in fact was terminated by Italy in July 1920.25 
Venizelos’ adherence to the Greek-Yugoslav coalition was also proved on 
the question of Northern Macedonia. The Greek Prime Minister ruled out all 
possibility of claiming the territory for Greece as Greek refugees from Monastir 
(Bitolj), Gevgeli, Strumnitsa and Dojran wanted. Organized in various clubs, 
unions and associations, North-Macedonian refugees in Thessaloniki soon be-
came a lobby which caused the Greek Government much trouble, giving rise 
to Yugoslav complaints on various occasions. However, Venizelos restricted 
himself to promising material assistance to those who should choose to stay in 
Greece permanently and stressed that he would not take any action to redraw 
the Greek-Yugoslav border.26 
In August 1919 negotiations about the re-establishment of the Serbian 
Patriarchate and its jurisdiction over South Serbia and Northern Macedonia 
began between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and a delegation of the KSCS. The 
main obstacle to the conclusion of the agreement was the issue of the fate of the 
Greek communities in Northern Macedonia. The Fanar demanded that the text 
of the agreement make an explicit mention of the cultural freedom of the Greek 
23 In a discussion with the American President, Woodrow Wilson, Pašić drew a parallel be-
tween the Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Italian presence in Albania, 
cf. Todorović, Jugoslavija i balkanske države, 54.
24 Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece at the Paris Peace Conference, 256. 
25 Konstantinos Svolopoulos, Η ελληνική εξωτερική πολιτική 1900–1945, τ. Α΄ [Greek Foreign 
Policy 1900–1945, vol. I] (Athens: Vivliopolio tis Estias, 2005), 147. 
26 Hassiotis, Ελληνοσερβικές σχέσεις 1913–1918, 353. 
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communities. The Yugoslav delegation replied that the KSCS had no intention 
to impede Greeks’ cultural life but they also stated that they were not authorized 
by their government to discuss such matters.27 Having received further instruc-
tions from Belgrade, the delegation made a counterproposal according to which 
no special mention to that effect would be made in the text, but instead the Ecu-
menical Patriarchate would address a letter to the two governments asking them 
to come to an agreement on the Greek communities. At the same time they 
asked for Venizelos’ intervention.28 In the end, the Fanar, following Venizelos’ 
advice, accepted the Yugoslav terms and issued the Synodal Tome. It was more 
than evident that the Greek Prime Minister did not have any intention to add 
such an issue to his agenda. In fact, Venizelos sacrificed the Greeks of Northern 
Macedonia for the sake of Greek-Yugoslav relations. To the same end, Belgrade 
raised neither the question of the Serbian free zone in the port of Thessaloniki29 
nor that of the Slavic population in Greek Macedonia and also turned down the 
French proposal for the internationalization of the city.30 
After the Treaty of Sevres (10 August 1920) was signed and the long-
standing dream of the Megali Idea which had dominated Greek politics since 
Independence seemed to come true, Venizelos called elections. He believed that 
his achievements in Paris (Treaty of Neuilly and Treaty of Sevres) would bring 
him a splendid victory. The Serbian Press launched a campaign in favour of 
Venizelos’ Liberal Party. The 10 October 1920 issue of Politika is highly indica-
tive: “His victory would mean that the real carrier of a political entente with us is 
not merely a political figure but a whole nation. We shall be the first to sincerely 
salute such a victory.”31 It was obvious, then, that for the KSCS, bilateral rela-
tions with Greece depended on the outcome of the elections. 
27 SDHA, CSA, 1920/49.2 Εκκλησιαστικά Σερβίας [Serbian ecclesiastical issues], Kanello-
poulos to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Constantinople, 26 August 1919, No. 6482.
28 Ibid., Kanellopoulos to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Constantinople, 7 March 1920, No. 
1734
29 The impact that the issue of the serbian/yugoslavian zone in the port of Thessaloniki had 
had on the greek-yugoslav relations during the interwar period is being thoroughly described 
in the article of Dragan Bakić, “The port of Salonica in Yugoslav Foreign Policy”, Balcanica 
XLIII (2012), 191–219.
30 Arhiv Jugoslavije [Archives of Yugoslavia; hereafter: АЈ], 336–F-59-XIIG/2, Delegacija 
Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca na Konferenciji Mira u Parizu, Pašić to Gavrilović, Paris, 
17 February 1919, No. 214.
31 Politika, 10/10/1920. 
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From the Greek elections (November 1920) to the end of the Greek-Turkish war 
(August/September 1922)
Liberals won the majority of votes in the elections, but because of the compli-
cated electoral system the United Opposition won a vast majority of seats in 
Parliament and formed a new government. One of the first moves of the incom-
ing pro-royalist government was to hold a referendum on the return of King 
Constantine, hated both by the Entente powers and by the KSCS because of 
his pro-German attitude during the First World War. On 6 December 1920, in 
a climate of fanaticism and deep political polarization, the referendum was held 
despite Liberals’ abstention. A few days later King Constantine was reinstated 
triumphantly. The course of events caused considerable concern in Belgrade. 
The restoration of the pro-German political elite in Greece also had a psycho-
logical effect in the KSCS. Thus, their victory was considered as a setback in 
Greek-Yugoslav relations. 
At the same time, the KSCS was coming to an agreement with Italy over 
Dalmatia. The Treaty of Rapallo signed on 12 November 1920 provided for the 
creation of the Free State of Fiume and the cession of Zara (Zadar) to Italy, 
thereby depriving the KSCS of an outlet to the ports of the Adriatic. So, the de-
pendence of the Yugoslav trade on the port of Thessaloniki became even greater. 
Moreover, the prospect of Aleksandar Stamboliyski’s visit to Belgrade in early 
1921 was an additional cause for concern for Athens. Following Constantine’s 
return, France had radically changed its policy towards Greece and supported a 
Yugoslav-Bulgarian rapprochement.32 The combination of all these factors gen-
erated in Athens the fear of a diplomatic isolation at a time when the war in Asia 
Minor was moving towards a new phase. 
Yet, Belgrade had good reasons not to change its policy towards Athens. 
The Yugoslavs believed that Stamboliyski’s party, the Bulgarian Agrarian Peo-
ple’s Union (BAPU), maintained contacts with the Internal Macedonian Rev-
olutionary Organization (IMRO), whose demand for an autonomous Mace-
donia was widening the rift between the two countries. The fact that the local 
population in Serbian Macedonia voted for the CPY, at IMRO leader’s (Todor 
Aleksandrov) instigation, both in local and in parliamentary elections in 1920 
was indicative of Bulgarian influence in the area. Furthermore, the armed action 
of IMRO in late 1920 and the Protocol of Tirana, i.e. an agreement signed by 
the Committee of Kosovo and IMRO, led to the closing of the Yugoslav-Bul-
32 Documents on British Foreign Policy, First Series [hereafter DBFP], vol. XII: The Balkan 
States, January 19 – December 31, 1920 (London: HMSO, 1962), No. 488, Memorandum by 
Mr. Nicolson on future foreign policy towards King Constantine, London, 20 December 
1920. 
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garian border.33 Thus, although Constantine had not been officially recognized 
by the Yugoslav government, relations between Athens and Belgrade remained 
unharmed and Greece was still considered an ally.34 The Bulgarian danger was 
still the common denominator of Greek-Yugoslav interests. On 11 April 1921 a 
joint note by Greece, KSCS and Romania was delivered to Sofia accusing the 
Bulgarian government of encouraging guerrilla activities and demanding urgent 
measures for the dissolution of revolutionary committees,35 while at the same 
time Belgrade’s Press made hints that the KSCS was planning to take over the 
mines in Pernik should Bulgaria keep avoiding implementing the Peace Trea-
ties.36 Additionally, contacts between Kemalists and Bulgarian revolutionary 
organizations, a visit of BAPU members to Ankara and the Bulgarian govern-
ment’s secret communication with Moscow were some of the proofs that Sofia’s 
intentions were not in compliance with the spirit of the Peace Treaties. 
At the insistence of both the French and British ambassadors in Belgrade, 
however, Pašić consented to receive the Bulgarian Minister of Interior, Alek-
sandar Dimitrov.37 In view of the forthcoming vote on the new Constitution, 
Pašić wanted to appease the Croatian Peasant Party of Stijepan Radić and the 
Alliance of Agrarian Workers of Mihajlo Avramović, both supporters of a rap-
prochement with the Bulgarian Agrarian government.38 Dimitrov assured Pašić 
that his government had abandoned its predecessors’ policy towards Macedonia, 
informed him that a sum of 40 million levas had been spent on combating komi-
tadjis, and also suggested that joint action should be taken by the two countries’ 
border authorities. However, Dimitrov was not given a warm reception. Pašić 
pointed out that the time was not yet ripe for the full normalization of bilateral 
33 Spyridon Sfetas, Makedonien und Interbalkanische Beziehungen 1920–1924 (Munich: Hie-
ronymus, 1992), 66.
34 Živko Avramovski, Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji. Godišnji izveštaj Britanskog poslanstva u 
Beogradu 1921–1938, vol. I: 1921–1930 (Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 1986), 25.
35 Sfetas, Makedonien und Interbalkanische Beziehungen, 69–70. 
36 DBFP vol. XXII: Central Europe and the Balkans 1921 (London: HMSO, 1980), No. 128, 
Young to Curzon, Belgrade, 3 March 1921.
37 At this point it should be noted that a Bulgarian representative, Kosta Todorov, had been 
appointed in Belgrade in September 1920. Todorov was a close associate of Stamboliyski and 
a firm advocate of Yugoslav-Bulgarian friendship as well. In his first statements he stressed 
that: “I have come to Belgrade to restore diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and Bul-
garia and to pave the way for a new era of friendship between our countries… I must confess 
that the war against Serbia was not only criminal but a fratricidal one as well. We must not 
forget that a man is now working in the opposite direction, a man who, when accused and im-
prisoned in 1914 because of his pro-Serbian sentiments, stated: ‘I am neither Bulgarian nor 
Serb, I am Yugoslav’.” Politika, 9/9/1920. Todorov was referring to Aleksandar Stamboliyski. 
38 Sfetas, Makedonien und Interbalkanische Beziehungen, 72.
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relations and, consequently, he turned down Bulgarian proposals.39 What was 
more important, though, was that before Dimitrov’s visit to Belgrade, the Bul-
garian Prime Minister had let his Serbian counterpart know, through the Yugo-
slav representative in Sofia, Milan Rakić, that Bulgaria was ready to undertake, 
together with the KSCS, military operations against Greece. Not surprisingly, 
such a proposal was not even taken seriously by Pašić.40
Similar suggestions had been also made by the Turkish side. In May 1921 
the Kemalists offered an alliance to the KSCS, according to which the two coun-
tries should launch a joint attack against Greece. Turkey would regain Asia Mi-
nor and the KSCS would finally obtain an outlet in Thessaloniki. In the Turkish 
view the Great Powers were too engrossed with the German question to inter-
vene, while Russia, as a Slavic country, would not oppose such a settlement.41 
However, Belgrade kindly refused once again.42 Apart from geopolitical distor-
tions which the return of the Turkish factor to the Balkans would entail, Pašić 
was also anxious about the influence that a victorious Kemalist Turkey might 
have upon the Muslim population in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbian Macedonia 
and Kosovo. The fliers found in Skoplje according to which IMRO and Mustafa 
Kemal were working together for an autonomous Macedonia showed that Bel-
grade’s fears were justified.43 
In June 1921 the KSCS and Romania signed a defensive alliance which 
was extended by a military convention in January 1922. These agreements were 
parts of a wider alliance, formed by the KSCS, Romania and Czechoslovakia on 
the basis of bilateral agreements, which is known as Little Entente (Petite En-
tente). Greek representatives in Belgrade and Bucharest had been kept informed 
of the negotiations and were also satisfied hearing from Take Ionescu, Roma-
nian Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the Greek-Serbian Treaty of Alliance and 
the bilateral agreements between Czechoslovakia, Romania and the KSCS were 
part of the same set.44 In January 1922, General Victoras Dousmanis was sent 
to Belgrade and Bucharest to sound out the position of the Yugoslav and Ro-
manian governments on the possibility of Greece participating in the Yugoslav-
39 Todorović, Jugoslavija i balkanske države, 112. 
40 DBFP, vol. XXII: Central Europe and the Balkans 1921, No. 181, Peel to Curzon, Sofia, 16 
June 1921.
41 AJ, 370-1-3, Poslanstvo KJ u Turskoj – Carigrad, Ankara, 1921, Chargé d’Affaires in Con-
stantinople to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 May 1921.
42 Ibid., Pašić to Chargé d’Affaires in Constantinople, Belgrade, 14 May 1921, con. No. 468. 
43 SDHA, CSA, 1922/12.3 Μακεδονικό Ζήτημα. Θέσεις των Βαλκανικών Χωρών. Τρόπος δράσης 
Μακεδονικού Κομιτάτου [Macedonian Question. Balkan Countries’ Views. Macedonian Com-
mittee’s mode of action], , Picheon to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Skoplje, 28 October 1921, 
No. 1133.
44 DBFP vol. XXII, No. 209, Grunville to Curzon, Athens, 1 July 1921. 
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Romanian defensive alliance and the prolongation of the Greek-Serbian Treaty 
of Alliance.45 But sending Dousmanis, an ex-adjutant of King Constantine and 
ardently pro-German during the First World War, in the mission did not prove 
to be a wise choice.46 However, Dousmanis was given assurances by Pašić that 
the KSCS would defend the Treaty of Neuilly. As far as the Greek-Turkish con-
flict was concerned, the Yugoslav government adopted a stance of benevolent 
neutrality. 
In June 1922, on the occasion of the royal wedding between King Alex-
ander Karadjordjević and the Romanian Princess, Maria of Hohenzollern-Sig-
maringen, a Greek delegation made up of the Ministers of Foreign and Military 
Affairs, Georgios Baldatzis and Nikolaos Theotokis, was sent to Belgrade. The 
two men raised once more the question of Greece’s joining the Little Entente.47 
The uncertainty about the final outcome of the Greek-Turkish war in Asia Mi-
nor was causing great anxiety in Athens about the fate of Western Thrace. That 
is the reason why the Greek government sought for diplomatic support abroad.48 
45 Alexis Kyrou, Οι Βαλκανικοί γείτονές μας [Our Balkan neighbours] (Athens 1962) 162. Ac-
cording to Yugoslav diplomatic sources the purpose of Dousmanis’ visit to Bucharest was to 
lay the foundations of a Greek-Romanian defensive alliance, something that the Romanians 
ruled out before the war in Asia Minor was over. AJ, 395-7-28 Poslanstvo KJ u Rumuniji – 
Bukurešt, Yugoslav Embassy to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bucharest, 25 January 1922, No. 
47, and highly confidential, 28 January 1922, No. 50. It should also be noted that the first 
attempt of joining the Yugoslav-Romanian-Czechoslovak coalition had been made by Veni-
zelos in 1920, just after signing the Treaty of Sevres. Venizelos believed that the safest way to 
secure his achievements was an alliance concluded by the winners, which would restrain re-
visionist tendencies.  But he encountered firm opposition from Edvard Beneš, who was more 
inclined towards Bulgarian participation. On the other hand, Take Ionescu, who wanted a 
wider alliance which would extend from the North Sea to the gulf of Thessaloniki, supported 
Venizelos. The KSCS held an attitude of ambivalence. Although it did not oppose Venizelos’ 
viewpoints, it wished to disassociate Central Europe’s issues from the Balkan ones.  SDHA, 
PEA, 1920/3.6, op. cit., Simopoulos to Politis, Prague, 3 August 1920, No. 298; Mavroudis 
to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgrade, 22 July 1920, No. 956, attached to No. 10130 con-
fidential, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Hellenic Embassy in Paris, Athens, 8 August 1920; 
Politis to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 15/28 August 1920, No. 5658
46 C. Iordan, Romănia și relațiile internaționale din sud estul European: probleme ale păcii, 
securității și cooperării (1919–1924) (Bucharest: All Istoric, 1999), 60. According to German 
sources the distrust towards Dousmanis shown by the Yugoslav side was a serious obstacle to 
the extension of the Treaty of Alliance which was to expire the following year, cf. Politisches 
Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes [hereafter PAAA], Bonn, Akten betreffend politische Bezie-
hungen zwischen, Griechenland und Jugoslawien, R 72 627, B 1 (5.10.1921 – 27.11.1925), 
German Embassy to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgrade, 2 February 1922, No. 126.
47 Avramovski, Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji, 94.
48 PAAA, R 72 627, B 1, German Embassy to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 8 May 
1922, No. 177.
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The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that the two sides had discussed 
several matters, such as the status of Western Thrace, the renewal of the Greek-
Serbian Treaty of Alliance (1913), the Serbian free zone in the port of Thessa-
loniki and coordinated action on behalf of Greece, the KSCS and Romania in 
order to eliminate the activities of komitadjis within their own countries.49 Yet, 
measures were taken only for the latter. It was evident that the Greek-Yugoslav 
collaboration was limited to coping with Bulgarian revisionism. There were no 
doubts, thus, that a closer cooperation between Athens and Belgrade was ham-
pered by the Greek involvement in Asia Minor. 
From the Greek debacle in Asia Minor (August/September 1922) to the Treaty of 
Lausanne ( July 1923)
Under the pressure of the military disaster, the chaotic and bloody evacuation of 
Smyrna and the uprooting of hundreds of thousands Greeks from their ances-
tral homeland in Asia Minor, King Constantine abdicated, for the second time 
in five years, and was succeeded by his son George II. A new government under 
Sotirios Krokidas was formed. Yet, the real power was in the hands of the Revo-
lutionary Committee, composed by pro-Venizelist officers (Colonels Nikolaos 
Plastiras and Stylianos Gonatas, and Commander Dimitrios Fokas), while the 
reins of Greek foreign policy were given again to Elefhterios Venizelos provided 
that Greece should consent to the loss of Eastern Thrace, as France persistently 
wanted. Apart from rapid political changes in Greece, the rise of Benito Mus-
solini to power in Italy and the divergent attitudes of the French and the British 
towards Turkey were making up the political context in which Belgrade and 
Athens were to adjust their policies. 
For the KSCS a Turkish comeback to European soil would only have 
an adverse effect. The 24 September 1922 issue of Politika remarked that “to 
the Italian-Hungarian-Bulgarian chain a Turkish link must also be added”.50 
Thus, the question of Thrace was of major importance for the Yugoslav offi-
cials. Pašić initially opposed the advance of Turkish troops beyond Gallipoli, 
while Momčilo Ninčić, Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, concurred with 
the French stance, which supported the restoration of Turkish rule in Eastern 
Thrace.51 Apart from that, for the KSCS it was fundamental that a possible 
amendment to the status quo in Thrace should not be combined with border 
change in favour of Bulgaria.52  
49 Politika, 10/6/1922; Καθημερινή [Kathimerini], 2/6/1922.
50 Politika, 24/09/1922. 
51 In the end, however, Pašić aligned with his Minister’s position.
52 Todorović, Jugoslavija i balkanske države, 177–178. 
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At the same time, Balugdžić in a bid to allay Greek concerns stated that 
the Yugoslav government would do its utmost to minimize Turkey’s territorial 
gains in Thrace and that the KSCS did not intended to denunciate the Greek-
Serbian Treaty of Alliance.53 On the other hand, though, Ninčić finally accepted 
Stamboliyski’s request to visit Belgrade. The rise of fascism in Italy forced Bel-
grade to reassess its relations with Sofia, given that Rome had been financing 
guerrilla activities and Bulgarian propaganda in Serbian Macedonia. From the 
Bulgarian perspective it was believed that after the Greek defeat in Asia Minor 
the circumstances were favourable for snatching Western Thrace and to that end 
a rapprochement with the KSCS was indispensable. 
That really bothered Greek officials who rushed to arrange a meeting 
with their Yugoslav counterparts earlier than the Bulgarians. On 5 November 
1922 the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nikolaos Politis, visited Belgrade. 
For Greece it was more necessary than ever before to tighten the relations with 
its traditional ally. Therefore the purpose of Politis’ visit was to secure diplomatic 
support to the upcoming Conference in Lausanne. Politis was warmly welcomed 
by Pašić and Ninčić and the talks held in a friendly atmosphere. Several issues, 
both of economic and political nature, were put on the table. Politis conveyed 
to Ninčić his government’s will to meet its commitments arising from the 1914 
Convention on the Serbian transit trade through the port of Thessaloniki and 
he stressed that a new commercial agreement between the two countries was 
also needed.54 As for political matters, Politis argued that the Greek government 
had no intentions to expel the Slavophones of Western Macedonia in order to 
settle Greek refugees from Asia Minor, as the Yugoslav Press had been suggest-
ing.55 He also argued that Greece had not so far intervened in favour of the 
Greek population in Northern Macedonia despite their countless appeals, and 
that Yugoslav press reports could be considered as interference in the internal 
affairs of Greece.56 Moreover, Politis brought to Ninčić’s attention the recent un-
rest in Nevrokop and suggested joint action with Romania in order to tackle the 
danger stemming from the Bulgarian komitadjis.57 As far as the Bulgarian outlet 
to the Aegean Sea was concerned, the Greek Minister mentioned that it was 
his government’s intentions to provide further facilitations, regarding the navi-
gation on Evros (Maritsa) river and the railway line Karagatsi-Alexandroupoli 
(Dedeagach), following the example of the Convention signed for the navigation 
53 Ibid. 176.
54 SDHA, CSA, 1922/17.5 Εξωτερικών και Εσωτερική Πολιτική Σερβίας [Foreign and Do-
mestic Policy of Serbia], Records of the talks between Ninčić, Pašić and Politis, Belgrade, 23 
October/5 November 1922. 
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
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on Danube.58 For their part, the Yugoslav officials stressed that the Greek gov-
ernment should not pay attention to various rumours spread by the press and 
that the minority issues between the two countries should be solved by bilateral 
agreements and not by the intervention of the League of Nations. For the same 
reason – that is to say to avoid international mediation – the Yugoslav Minister 
declined Politis’ offer for common action against komitadjis. He noted, though, 
that due to racial kinship the Yugoslav government was obliged to maintain un-
relenting focus on the Slavophones of Western Macedonia.59 Regarding the Bul-
garian outlet to the Aegean, Ninčić outlined that Belgrade would not give its con-
sent to Bulgarian excessive demands and recommended that no initiative should 
be taken on this particular issue before the opening of the Conference.60 In reply 
to Politis’ query about the attitude of the KSCS in case of a new Greek-Turkish 
conflict, Ninčić gave assurances that Belgrade would not tolerate a Bulgarian as-
sault on Greece,61 but evaded pledging direct military support to Greece. Finally, 
King Alexander pointed out that the reorganization of the Greek Army62 and 
the consolidation of the new regime in Athens was of paramount importance 
not only for Greece but also for the whole Balkan Peninsula.63 
A few days later Stamboliyski was received in Belgrade. It was the first 
time since the Balkan Wars that a Bulgarian Prime Minister visited Serbian cap-
ital. In order to gain Yugoslav government’s support on the issue of the Bulgarian 
outlet to the Aegean, Stamboliyski had waived any territorial claims on Serbian 
Macedonia, renounced the destabilizing activities of the Bulgarian-Macedonian 
organizations which were turning against the KSCS and promised to take mea-
sures against the komitadjis.64 For Bulgaria, an outlet, either as an internation-
alization of a strip of territory from the Bulgarian border to Alexandroupoli or 
as a form of autonomy for Western Thrace – which would ultimately lead to the 
annexation to Bulgaria – was interpreted as a territorial one. However, the Yu-
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 One of the most difficult tasks that the Revolutionary Committee had been charged with 
was to form a capable fighting force from the remnants of the Army of Asia and restore order 
and discipline in the army. This mission was carried out successfully by General Theodoros 
Pangalos. Very soon Greece disposed of an army of more than 100,000 soldiers capable of 
undertaking a new offensive on Eastern Thrace. 
63 Ιστορικό Αρχείο Ελευθερίου Βενιζέλου [Historical Archive of Eleftherios Venizelos 
(HAVE)], Ι/42/126, Politis to Venizelos, Belgrade, 5 November 1922, No. 212
64 Živko Avramovski, “Makedonsko pitanje u jugoslovensko-bugarskim odnosima od 1918. 
do 1925. godine”, in Jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi u XX veku, vol. I, ed. Živko Avramovski 
(Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju; Narodna knjiga, 1980), 162.
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goslav officials doubted Stamboliyski’s competence and decisiveness to impose 
his will in his own country. Besides that, the possibility of an autonomous West-
ern Thrace entailed a lot of dangers for Serbian Macedonia, since it would in-
fringe on the Treaty of Neuilly. In fact, during the Peace Conference in Lausanne 
Ninčić stated that “…the word autonomy should not be used in the Balkans.”65 
The Conference in Lausanne opened in late November 1922. The Turk-
ish delegation was highly assertive, raising territorial claims in Karaagach and 
Didymoteicho and demanding a plebiscite for Western Thrace. Likewise, the 
Bulgarian delegation put forward autonomy as the solution for Western Thrace, 
or at least its neutralization under international command, as the most appro-
priate way to ensure an outlet to the Aegean Sea, rejecting all alternatives pre-
sented by Venizelos. More or less the same also went for Turkey. As the Greek-
Turkish differences seemed irreconcilable, the resumption of warfare was still a 
plausible scenario. In this fluctuating and uncertain situation, Venizelos sought 
to form a common front with the KSCS. In late December he submitted an 
informal proposal to the Yugoslav ambassador in Paris and member of the Yu-
goslav delegation in Lausanne, Miroslav Spalajković, according to which Greece 
was willing to cede the city of Florina with its districts to the KSCS in exchange 
for military cooperation against Turkey.66 In particular, Venizelos’ plan provided 
for a Yugoslav mediation to Paris and London in favour of Greece and for the 
deployment of two Yugoslav divisions (or one division and heavy artillery) across 
the Greek-Turkish front and of another two divisions to the Yugoslav-Bulgarian 
border. In case of success Greece would regain Eastern Thrace up to Çatalca and 
the Florina district would be granted to the KSCS.67 Despite its initial objec-
tions due to the cession of Greek territory, the Revolutionary Committee gave 
its consent to Venizelos’ plan.68 In late January Lieutenant General Alexandros 
Mazarakis-Ainian was sent to Belgrade carrying a letter of Venizelos to Pašić 
with the aforementioned content. But Pašić avoided meeting him. According 
to Mazarakis, Pašić’s reluctance to receive him should be imputed to French in-
tervention.69 Reckoning that a new round of the Greek-Turkish war in Eastern 
Thrace could lead to the Soviet invasion of Romania with the prospect of turn-
65 Paximadopoulou-Stavrinou, Η Δυτική Θράκη, 216, fn. 19. 
66 Υπουργείο των Εξωτερικών, 1919–1940, Ελληνικά Διπλωματικά Έγγραφα, τ. 3 [Ypourgeio ton 
Eksoterikon, Greek Diplomatic Documents, vol. III] (Athens 1994), Venizelos to Alexandris, 
Lausanne, 18/31 December 1922, No. 216.
67 Ibid., Venizelos to Alexandris, Lausanne, 8/21 January 1923, No. 321, ed. n. 408–409, and 
Venizelos to Alexandris, Lausanne, 9/22 January 1923, No. 323. See also HAVE, Ι/43/16α, 
Venizelos to Alexandris, Lausanne, 19 January 1923, No. 484.
68 Ibid., Plastiras, Gonatas, Alexandris to Venizelos, Athens, 19 December 1922/1 January, 
1923, No. 221. 
69 Alexandrou Mazaraki-Ainianos, Απομνημονεύματα [Memoirs] (Athens: Ikaros, 1948), 330.
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ing a localized conflict into an international crisis, French policy-makers exer-
cised their influence on the Yugoslav government to dodge military adventures.70 
Apart from that, the Yugoslavs did not intend to come to any political 
agreement with Greece unless the issue of the free zone in the port of Thes-
saloniki was solved.71 It was more than obvious that the circumstances favoured 
the Yugoslav cause and that it was the most opportune time for the KSCS to 
obtain tangible concessions. Having consulted with his government in Belgrade, 
Živojin Balugdžić addressed a memorandum to the Greek Minister of Nation-
al Finance, Andreas Hadjikyriakos, which set forth the Yugoslav position (the 
free trade zone should be extended for the needs of bilateral trade with Greece; 
joint Greek-Yugoslav railway stations should be established in Thessaloniki and 
Gevgeli; and Yugoslav customs officials should operate in the free zone which 
should be granted to the KSCS).72 A group of Greek experts was charged with 
the task to assess the Yugoslav memorandum and come up with a plan. The 
Greek side acquiesced to ceding part of Thessaloniki’s port but insisted that the 
customs, police and judicial authorities remain under Greek jurisdiction in that 
part as well. In order to maintain its sovereignty the Greek government was also 
planning, as an alternative, to hand over the management of the free zone to a 
private Yugoslavian enterprise.73 As expected, Belgrade was not satisfied and, in 
fact, it did not fail to express its discontent. The statements that Balugdžić gave 
to the Politika on 11 February 1923 were most characteristic. In reference to the 
question of the Serbian free zone, the Yugoslav Minister in Athens stressed that: 
“…it was the fulfilment of an obligation in the framework of the Greek-Serbian 
Alliance as a condition for the recognition of Greek sovereignty over Thessa-
loniki… Thessaloniki had been saved in the Second Balkan War by common 
efforts… Complete freedom for our import and export trade must not be seen as 
a concession.”74 He also believed that Athens had no choice but to relent,75 while 
both the Greek and Yugoslav Press were stressing that the Yugoslav government 
would exert much more pressure on Greece on the issue of the Thessaloniki 
port as long as the route to the Adriatic was cut off by Italy.76 At the same time 
70 AJ, 395-9-96, Ninčić to Yugoslav Embassy in Bucharest, Belgrade, 15 January 1923, No. 339.
71 DBFP, vol. XXIV: Central Europe and the Balkans 1922–23 (London: HMSO, 1983), 
Young to Curzon, Belgrade, 4 January 1923, No. 236.
72 See also Bakić, “The port of Salonica in Yugoslav Foreign Policy 1919–1941”, 198.
73 Ibid., Bentinck to Curzon, Athens, 10 March 1923, No.  294.
74 Politika, 23/02/1923. 
75 AJ, 334-9-29, Ministarstvo inostranih poslova KJ, Balugdžić to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Athens, 24 December 1922.
76 DBFP, vol. XXIV: Central Europe and the Balkans 1922–23, Young to Curzon, Belgrade, 4 
January 1923, No. 238, fn. 1; Ελεύθερο Βήμα [Eleftheron Vima], 21/03/1923.
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Yugoslav-Bulgarian negotiations about the question of komitadjis, whose action 
had become uncontrollable, were launched in Niš. As in the past, the likelihood 
of a South-Slavic rapprochement between Belgrade and Sofia fuelled anxiety in 
Athens. 
In view of the re-opening of the Conference in Lausanne, the new Greek 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Apostolos Alexandris, visited Belgrade on 14 April 
1923 in order to be informed about the negotiations in Niš and also to obtain 
Yugoslav views on the questions that were to be further discussed in Lausanne. 
Alexandris was expressly reassured that the talks in Niš were of a technical na-
ture and that no political agreement had been reached between the two sides.77 
Apart from that, Pašić and Ninčić reiterated that the KSCS should remain neu-
tral in case of a Greek-Turkish war and that it was also willing to make a dip-
lomatic demarche to Sofia so as to ward off an attack in the rear of the Greek 
army. The Yugoslav officials also stressed to Alexandris that the Yugoslav delega-
tion would stand up for Greece on the question of the war reparations which 
Ankara persistently demanded and that the KSCS would not tolerate any solu-
tion for Western Thrace which would not be acceptable to Athens.78 In return, 
Alexandris demonstrated good will to address Yugoslav demands regarding the 
free zone in the port of Thessaloniki on condition that Greek sovereignty was 
preserved. In particular, the Greeks accepted the establishment of Yugoslav cus-
tom authorities within the zone, but they insisted that the harbourmaster had 
police and judicial jurisdiction over the zone. Besides, the Greek side ruled out 
the possibility of the appointment of a Yugoslav vice-harbourmaster, which, for 
the Greeks, would indicate a form of a Greek-Yugoslav condominium over the 
port. The two sides came to terms on 10 May 1923 when the Convention on the 
Regulation of Transit via Salonica was signed at Belgrade. Unlike the 1914 Con-
vention the new one contained an explicit reference to a “Serbian Free Zone”.79 
The zone was an integral part of Greek territory but labelled as “Serbian” and 
based on the legislation of the KSCS. The employees were citizens of the KSCS 
and were appointed by its government. 
The agreement had a positive effect on the Greek cause in Lausanne. After 
the Convention had been signed the Yugoslav delegation sided with Venizelos 
in rejecting the Turkish demands for war reparations.80 However, in mid-May 
1923 while the negotiations in Lausanne seemed to have reached an impasse the 
Yugoslav government refused to make a demarche to Sofia as had been prom-
77 Sfetas, Makedonien und Interbalkanische Beziehungen, 163.
78 DBFP, vol. XXIV: Central Europe and the Balkans 1922–23, Young to Curzon, Belgrade, 12 
April 1923, No. 325. 
79 Paximadopoulou-Stavrinou, Η Δυτική Θράκη, 242, fn. 106. 
80 Υπουργείο των Εξωτερικών, 1919–1940, Kaklamanos to Alexandris, Lausanne, 7 May 1923, 
No. 520.
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ised to Alexandris. Ninčić justified his government’s decision by stressing that 
Belgrade did not desire to encourage bellicose tendencies81 in Greece but, on 
the contrary, to preserve peace in the area. He reasserted that the KSCS would 
remain neutral as regards the Greek-Turkish conflict but underlined that similar 
assurances would not be given either to Turkey or to Bulgaria.82 In other words 
the Yugoslav government intended to create some sort of peer pressure on all 
concerned and also to highlight that the resumption of warfare was the worst-
case scenario. Finally, the Greek-Turkish dispute was settled after a personal 
agreement between Venizelos and Ismet Inönü, head of the Turkish delegation 
in Lausanne. Venizelos consented to the cession of Karaagach to Turkey and 
in return Inönü abandoned all claims to war reparations. In this way Venizelos 
avoided a war which would probably have had unspeakable repercussions for 
Greece and at the same time posed a major obstacle to the Bulgarian outlet to 
the Aegean Sea, since that should now pass through Turkish territory. 
Conclusion
For Greece the Treaty of Lausanne (24 June 1923) signified the end of an era. 
The dream of a Greece of two continents and five seas with Constantinople as its 
capital had faded away once and for all. The entombment of the Megali Idea 
drove Greek foreign policy in completely different directions. Territorial integri-
ty and national security were now the main priorities of the Greek governments 
which at the same time were facing political instability, economic devastation 
and social upheaval caused by the influx of more than one million refugees from 
Asia Minor, Eastern Thrace and the Black Sea. By contrast, the KSCS, despite 
its domestic problems, had an enhanced role in European and, particularly, 
Balkan politics. In such circumstances the traditional Greek-Serbian/Yugo-
slav friendship was put to the test. In November 1924 Belgrade denounced the 
Greek-Serbian Treaty of Alliance (1913) on the pretext of the Greek-Bulgarian 
protocol on minorities signed in September 1924. Given that the Yugoslav of-
81 It is true that the high-ranking officers of the Revolutionary Committee were urging Veni-
zelos to let them undertake military operations even without Yugoslav assistance. But Veni-
zelos ruled out that possibility claiming that without the approval of the Entente Powers and 
Bulgarian neutrality every military initiative taken by the Greek Army should be considered 
as a national suicide. Ibid., Venizelos to Alexandris, Lausanne, 2/15 January 1923, No. 296. 
See also HAVE, I/43/11, Venizelos to Alexandris (via London), Lausanne, 1/14 January 
1923, No. 829.  
82 Υπουργείο των Εξωτερικών, 1919–1940, Mavroudis to Venizelos,  Belgrade, 24 May 1923, 
No. 578 and 579; AJ 395–9-95, Ninčić to Yugoslav Embassy in Bucharest, Belgrade, 24 May 
1923, No. 219.
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ficials had been aware of the content of the Greek-Bulgarian negotiations, one 
may conclude that the real reason for the denunciation was that the KSCS83 
wanted to impose its views regarding several bilateral issues upon Greece by 
negotiating a new alliance treaty with the Greek government from a position of 
strength. Apparently, Greece’s weakness worked in the favour of such a manoeu-
ver. Since then bilateral relations between Athens and Belgrade entered a cold 
period. It was only after Venizelos’ return to power in 1928 and the conclusion 
of a Greek-Italian Treaty of amity, reconciliation and juridical settlement that 
the policy-makers in the KSCS started again to look upon their Greek counter-
parts as equal partners.  
UDC 94(495:497.1)
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